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BURDEN OF PROOF IN
"SPECIAL EXCEPTION" CASES
More than just another gas station zoning case, Appeal of Facciolo'
makes a departure from the traditional burden of proof requirements
in "special exception" service station cases. In that case, the plaintiff,
Facciolo, requested a "special exception" from the board of ad-
justment before constructing a gasoline station on his commercially
zoned lot. Since the board found that another station would greatly
increase the traffic problems in the area,2 it denied Facciolo's request
on the grounds that the station would be detrimental to public safety
and general welfare of the community. Following the general rule
that the zoning authority has broad discretion in matters of opinion
and policy,3 the trial court upheld the board's ruling. Facciolo ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Agreeing with the decision of the lower court, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania refused to overturn the board's decision.4 Although
the controversy, to that point, appeared to be a typical gasoline station
case, the court's reasoning rested on a premise which could potentially
impair the board's power in zoning for land use controls:
When there is an application for a special exception, the burden
is on those who would deny the exception to show that the grant-
ing of such exception would be adverse to the public interest.5
(Emphasis added)
This appears to be quite a departure from the majority of the
opinions which have traditionally placed the burden of proof upon
the party contesting the regulation, at least in regard to a potentially
noxious use, such as a gasoline station.
It is important to note that the Facciolo case involved a request for
a special exception rather than a hardship variance. Although the
1. 440 Pa. 508, 269 A.2d 699 (1970).
2. See generally Fonoroff and Terrill, Controlling Traffic Through Zoning, 21
SYRAcusE L. Ray. 857 (1970).
3. Williams, The Numbers Game: Gasoline Service Stations and Land Use
Controls, 1969 URBAN L. ANN-i. 26 [hereinafter cited as Williams]; Adler v. City
of Baltimore, 220 Md. 623, 155 A.2d 504 (1959).
4. 440 Pa. 508, 269 A.2d 699 (1970).
5. Id. at 511, 269 A.2d at 701.
6. Williams at 26.
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plaintiff need not demonstrate unusual hardship in order to obtain
an exception, 7 the board will not grant one as a matter of right. The
exception is still considered "a privilege, not ... [a] right, assuming
that the requisite facts and conditions in the ordinance are found to
exist."8 Numerous cases in other jurisdictions have either expressly or
implicitly placed the burden of proof on the applicant in gasoline sta-
tion decisions. However, the degrees of the burden vary among dif-
ferent jurisdictions.
Some courts have placed a seemingly light burden on the plaintiff,
such as a recent Maryland case, Rockville Fuel and Feed Co. v. Board
of Appeals,9 which held that "the applicant has the burden of adducing
testimony which will show that his use meets the prescribed standards
and requirements." 10 Apparently this was the only burden the court
placed upon the plaintiff, but the implications of such a decision
would, of course, depend greatly upon the standards which the board
had developed.
Although the Maryland decision reflects the more modern approach,
some cases, such as Monforte v. Zoning Board of Review,?1 have placed
an extremely heavy burden of proof upon the plaintiff. In Monforte
the court upheld the board's refusal to grant a special exception be-
cause it found that "the applicant had failed to establish that the
public welfare and convenience would be substantially served by a
grant of the exception . . . :'12 This places a very heavy burden of
proof on the plaintiff, because surely it would be most difficult to
prove that another service station would substantially serve the con-
venience and welfare of the public.
Other decisions have imposed a burden upon the applicant which is
somewhat greater than that in Rockville yet lighter than that in
Monforte. As early as 1952, Executive Television Corporation v. Zon-
ing Board of Appeals,13 for example, required the plaintiff to show
only that the board acted arbitrarily and unreasonably. The court
defined reasonableness as acting "fairly or within proper motives or
7. See Note, The Use and Abuse of the Special Permit in Zoning Law, 35
BROOKLYN L. Rvy. 258, 260 (1969).
8. Blair v. Board of Adjustment, 403 Pa. 105, 169 A.2d 49 (1961).
9. 257 Md. 183, 262 A.2d 499 (1970).
10. Id. at 190, 262 A.2d at 503.
11. 93 R.I. 447, 176 A.2d 726 (1962).
12. Id. at 449, 176 A.2d at 727.
13. 138 Conn. 452, 85 A.2d 904 (1952).
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upon valid reasons.", However, it noted that the board possesses
wide discretion in denying and granting a special exception. Another
middle-of-the-road position was followed in a 1969 Connecticut case,1 5
which denied the plaintiff's request for a special exception because it
had failed to meet the burden of proving that the station would not
be detrimental to the public safety.
Thus, although the burden of proof in service station cases has
traditionally fallen upon the applicant for the exception, the degree
of the burden will depend on the interpretations of the particular
state courts. Nevertheless, the trend points towards a lighter burden.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota," for example, only required the
plaintiff to show that the board acted arbitrarily, but went on to ex-
plain that "the failure of the council to record any legally sufficient
basis for its determination at the time it acted made a prima fade
showing of arbitrariness ....,17 Such a decision seems to come very
close to shifting the burden of proof to the board.
In spite of the movement towards lessening the burden, no cases
have gone as far as the Pennsylvania decisions, in the absence of a
statute." In the Facciolo case, not only did the court shift the burden
of proof to the township, it placed a heavy factual burden upon it:
We feel the record indicates the Township did meet its heavy
burden of establishing that the increased traffic and abnormal
traffic patterns resulting from turns into and out of the station
had a high degree of probability of causing serious detriment to
the community.19 (Emphasis added)
In reaching such a conclusion, the court followed two earlier Penn-
sylvania decisions which had also placed the burden of proof upon
the city. However, these cases involved a grant for a church o and a
college.2' In the latter case, the court found that the board abused its
14. Id. at 455, 85 A.2d at 905.
15. Etzel v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 155 Conn. 539, 235 A.2d 647 (1967).
16. Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192, 167 N.W.2d 45 (1969).
17. Id. at 198, 167 N.W.2d at 50.
18. Syosset Holding Corp. v. Schlimm, 15 Misc. 2d 10, 159 N.Y.S.2d 88 (Sup.
Ct. 1956). While the court found that the plaintiff had the burden to show that
it had met the requirements, the New York statute required that once this was
demonstrated, the board had a duty to issue the exception.
19. 440 Pa. at 515 n.3, 269 A.2d at 703 n.3.
20. Jacobi v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 413 Pa. 286, 196 A.2d 742 (1964).
21. Appeal of Delaware Community College, 435 Pa. 264, 254 A.2d 641 (1969).
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discretion in denying the permit on the grounds of density, sewage,
and traffic problems, and said, "[W]here there is an application for a
legislatively provided special exception, the burden is on those who
would deny the exception to prove that it is detrimental to the health,
safety, welfare and morals of the community." 22
Nevertheless, this rule is easier to apply to a public institution, such
as a school or church, than to a potentially noisy and odorous private,
commercial use like a gasoline station. For example, in Appeal of
Archbishop O'Hara,2 3 the court said that the burden was not on the
plaintiff to show that the use would not have an adverse effect upon
the community, but the decision later noted the court's historical
reluctance to exclude schools from residential areas.
Thus, Facciolo may have interpreted the previous Pennsylvania de-
cisions too broadly in extending them to service stations. On the
other hand, the character of such a use would automatically place a
lighter burden on the city, at least as compared to schools and
churches, because "it is comparatively easy for the zoning board of
adjustment to refuse a special exception for a gasoline station .... -24
With traffic problems,25 a tendency to depreciate surrounding prop-
erty,26 existing stations in the area,27 and proximity to schools and
churches,28 the board is already armed with some powerful ammuni-
tion to kill a proposed station in certain areas.
How Facciolo will affect the power of the zoning board of appeals
to control service stations remains to be seen. A late 1970 Pennsyl-
vania decision, Appeal of Stefonick,29 chose to follow the line of cases
in that state which agree with Facciolo that "the burden is on the
Board to prove that the grant of the exception would be injurious.' 9
Although the court in Stefonick accepted that rule, it admitted that
it might be an illogical one. In this respect it recognized the strong
22. Id. at 268, 254 A.2d at 643.
23. 389 Pa. 35, 131 A.2d 587 (1957).
24. Michie, The Special Exception in Zoning in Pennsylvania-1963, 36 Tmp.
L.Q. 298, 309 (1963).
25. See Elliot v. Joyce, 233 Md. 76, 195 A.2d 254 (1963).
26. See Gordon v. Plonski, 11 App. Div. 2d 693, 204 N.Y.S.2d 590 (1960).
27. See Center Realty Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 96 R.I. 482, 194 A.2d
671 (1963).
28. See Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 148 Conn. 507, 172
A.2d 607 (1961).
29. 1 Pa. Commw. Ct. 13, 271 A.2d 707 (1970).
30. Id. at - , 271 A.2d at 708.
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criticism of Chief Justice Bell, who has consistently opposed the rea-
soning of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court even when the burden
fell upon the city in a case involving a church:
Since zoning is justifiable and Constitutional only if it is reason-
ably necessary to protect public health or safety or morals and
general welfare, isn't it logical to hold that one who asks for an
exception to a presumptively valid and Constitutional Act or
Ordinance has the two-fold burden of proving that his proposed
building or proposed use (1) falls within a legislatively excepted
permissible building or use, and (2) that it is not detrimental to
public health or safety or morals or general welfare131
One writer32 has suggested that by placing a heavy burden upon
the board, the presumption of validity might sustain a regulation
the wisdom of which is debatable. However, it seems to this author
that by continuing to allow the board to exercise its broad discretion
and keeping the burden of proof on the applicant for a special excep-
tion, zoning, as a land use control, can be more effective.
Leonard D. Vines
31. Jacobi v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 413 Pa. 286, 293, 196 A.2d 742, 746
(1964) (concurring opinion).
32. Williams at 29.
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